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Consent To Harm
Vera Bergelson

Abstract

This article continues conversation about consent to physical harm started in Vera
Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 165 (2007).
Intentionally injuring or killing another person is presumptively wrong. To overcome this presumption, the perpetrator must establish a defense of justification.
Consent of the victim may serve as one of the grounds for such a defense. This
article puts forward criteria for the defense of consent.
One element of the proposed defense is essential to both its complete and partial forms ¨C that consent of the victim be rational and voluntary. In addition,
for complete justification, the perpetrator¡¯s reasons for a consensual injurious act
should be subjectively benevolent and the act must produce an overall positive
balance of harms and evils, including harm to the victim¡¯s welfare interests and
dignity. If these requirements are not met, the defense should be only partial.
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Consent To Harm

Vera Bergelson*
The case of People v. Jovanovic, dubbed by tabloids the
“cybersex torture” case, 1 began in November 1996, when Jamie
Ruzcek, a twenty-year-old Barnard student, reported to the
police that she had been sexually assaulted by Oliver
Jovanovic, a thirty-year-old doctoral candidate at Columbia
University. 2 The alleged assault happened during the first
“live” date between Jovanovic and Ruzcek, which took place
after weeks of their on-line conversations and e-mail
correspondence. 3 According to Ruzcek, “Jovanovic had hogtied
her for nearly twenty hours, violently raped and sodomized her,
struck her repeatedly with a club, severely burned her with
candle wax, and repeatedly gagged her with a variety of
materials.” 4
Jovanovoic was prosecuted, convicted of kidnapping,
sexual abuse and assault, and sentenced to a term of 15 years

* Professor of Law, Robert E. Knowlton Scholar, Rutgers School of LawNewark; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Institute of Slavic and
Balkan Studies at the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. This article
is based, in part, and continues the discussion started in Vera Bergelson, The
Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
165 (2007) (hereinafter, The Right to Be Hurt). It will be also published,
substantially in the same form, as a chapter in a multi-authored book, THE
ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Alan Wertheimer & Franklin G.
Miller eds., 2009). I am grateful to the participants of the Victims and
Criminal Justice System symposium at Pace Law School for their thoughtful
comments, and to the deputy director of Rutgers Law Library Paul Axel-Lute
and my research assistant Linda Posluszny for their massive help in
researching this project.
1. Jovanovic v. City of New York, No. 04-8437, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59165, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2006).
2. Id. at *4.
3. People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (App. Div. 1999).
4. Jovanovic, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59165, at *4.
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to life. 5 He was released after twenty months in prison when
the appellate court ruled that the trial judge improperly denied
admission of portions of Ruzcek’s e-mails to Jovanovic, in which
she discussed her sadomasochistic interests and experience. 6
The court explained: “Because the jury could have inferred
from the redacted e-mail messages that the complainant had
shown an interest in participating in sadomasochism with
Jovanovic, this evidence is clearly central to the question of
whether she consented to the charged kidnapping and sexual
abuse.” 7 Since non-consent is an element of both offenses—
kidnapping and sexual abuse—the appellate court properly
reversed Jovanovic’s convictions on both charges. But the court
did not stop there; it also reversed Jovanovic’s conviction of
assault in the second- and third- degree.
Under New York law, a person is guilty of second-degree
assault when, “[w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another
person, he causes such injury to such person . . . by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.” 8 A person is guilty
of third-degree assault when “[w]ith intent to cause physical
injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person .
. . .” 9 Neither statutory provision lists the lack of consent as an
element to be proven by the prosecution or allows for the
defense of consent. And yet the appellate court did something
quite remarkable: it reversed the assault conviction and at the
same time (albeit in a footnote only) reiterated the traditional
rule that “[t]here is no available defense of consent on a charge
of assault. . . .” 10 The court elaborated:
Indeed, while a meaningful distinction can be made
between an ordinary violent beating and violence in
which both parties voluntarily participate for their
own sexual gratification, nevertheless, just as a
person cannot consent to his or her own murder, as a
matter of public policy, a person cannot avoid criminal
responsibility for an assault that causes injury or

5. Id. at *9.
6. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 159..
7. Id. at 168..
8. N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(2) (McKinney 2006).
9. N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00(1) (McKinney 2004).
10. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 169 n.5.
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carries a risk of serious harm, even if the victim asked
for or consented to the act. 11

In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Judge Mazzarelli pointed out the obvious discrepancy between
the majority’s holding (consent is not a defense to assault) and
decision (reversal of the assault conviction). 12 He also opined
that the evidence produced at the trial was sufficient to support
the defendant’s conviction of assault, 13 and the majority did not
dispute that conclusion. 14 Technically, Judge Mazzarelli was
right, and the majority was wrong. The decision defied both
formal logic and the established rule, according to which
consent to assault, including private sadomasochistic activities,
could not exculpate the perpetrator. 15
However, from the perspective of fairness and internal
consistency of criminal sanctions, the Jovanovic appellate
decision was more justifiable than the current rule of law.
Consider this: assuming Jovanovic indeed caused Ruzcek a lot
of pain and anguish, why should her consent shield him from
criminal liability for sexual violence and kidnapping, but not
for assault? Clearly, this is not because rape or kidnapping is a
11. Id. (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 174 (Mazzarelli, J.P., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
13. Id. Judge Mazzarelli wrote:
[T]he complaining witness's testimony was sufficient to support both of
these convictions, and, in the circumstances, hot candle wax was
appropriately considered a dangerous instrument. Moreover, the
complainant’s testimony was corroborated by a neighbor who heard
sounds as if someone were “undergoing root canal” from defendant’s
apartment at the time in question, by the complaining witness's prompt
outcries to five individuals, some of these individuals' observations of
the complaining witness's injuries, the lab results as to her clothing,
and the e-mails sent between the complaining witness and defendant
subsequent to the incident.
Id. at 175 (citations omitted).
14. See, e.g., id. at 198 n.5 (majority opinion) (accepting the jury finding
that the victim was physically injured during her encounter with the
defendant).
15. See, e.g., People v. Samuels, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439, 513-14 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967); State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 305-07 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985);
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1059-61 (Mass. 1980); State v.
Van, 688 N.W.2d 600, 613-15 (Neb. 2004); R v. Emmett, [1999] EWCA (Crim)
1710 (Eng.); R v. Brown, [1992] 2 All E.R. 552 (A.C.); R v. Donovan, (1934) 2
Eng. Rep. 498, 503 (K.B.).
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less serious offense than assault. In fact, a person in danger of
being raped or kidnapped has the right to use any physical
force, including deadly force, to protect him or herself against
that danger, whereas a person in danger of a simple assault
does not have the same right. And yet, consent of the victim
“turns a rape into love-making, a kidnapping into a Sunday
drive, a battery into a football tackle, a theft into a gift, and a
trespass into a dinner party,” 16 but, except in a couple of
narrowly defined circumstances, it is powerless to change the
moral and legal character of assault.
I. The Origins and Current Boundaries of the Rule of Consent
Historically, the special rule of consent to physical harm
originated in Anglo-American jurisprudence in the 17th
century. Prior to that, an individual was free to consent
practically to anything, and consent was viewed as a complete
ban on prosecution. As the famous maxim goes, volenti non fit
injuria: “a person is not wronged by that to which he
consents.” 17 Changes came as a result of the monopolization of
the system of punishment by the state. While in the early ages
of criminal justice the victim was the central figure in the
prosecution and settlement of any nonpublic offense, 18 in the
normative and centralized judicial structure the victim became
almost entirely excluded from the criminal process. 19 “In
contrast to the understanding of crime as a violation of the
victim’s interest, the emergence of the state developed another
16. Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal that
Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 503, 504 (2005).
17. See Terence Ingman, A History of the Defence of Volenti Non Fit
Injuria, 26 JURID. REV. 1, 8-9 (1981).
18. See HARRY ELMER BARNES & NEGLEY K. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN
CRIMINOLOGY 342 (2d ed. 1951) (explaining that public offenses were those
that exposed a “group to spiritual or human enemies, particularly the
former”). “Crimes against persons were not controlled by the tribe or the
family but by the clan under the principle of blood feud.” Id.
19. See Clarence Ray Jeffery, The Development of Crime in Early
English Society, 47 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 647, 662 (1957)
(“By 1226 an agreement between the criminal and the relatives of a slain
man would not avail to save the murderer from an indictment and a sentence
of death. The state no longer allowed a private settlement of a criminal
case.”).
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interpretation: the disturbance of the society.” 20 An increasing
number of historically “private” offenses were reconceptualized
as “public.” 21 The state (or king) became the ultimate victim
and the sole prosecutor of a criminal act. 22 Consequently, an
individual lost the power to consent to what the state regarded
as harm to itself.
In one of the earliest English cases that rejected consent of
the victim as a defense to serious bodily harm, the court opined
that the defendant was guilty because, by maiming the willing
victim, he deprived the king of the aid and assistance of one of
his subjects. 23 Three centuries later, an American court used a
very similar argument, explaining that the “commonwealth
needs the services of its citizens quite as much as the kings of
England needed the services of theirs.” 24
Today, American law continues to maintain that one’s life
and body do not quite belong to him.
Accordingly, an
individual has a very limited power to authorize an act that
affects his physical well-being. For example, the Model Penal
Code (“MPC”) views consent of the victim as a defense “if such
consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the
infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense.” 25 This general rule, however, does not
apply to offenses involving bodily harm. In those cases,
consent of the victim exonerates the perpetrator only in three
sets of circumstances: (i) when the injury is not serious; 26 (ii)
when the injury or its risk are “reasonably foreseeable hazards”
of participation in a “lawful athletic contest or competitive
sport or other concerted activity not forbidden by law;” 27 and

20. STEPHEN SCHAFER, VICTIMOLOGY: THE VICTIM AND HIS CRIMINAL 22
(1977).
21. By the eighteenth century, all crimes and misdemeanors were
regarded as public wrongs. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *5
(explaining that “public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanours, are a breach
and violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole community. . .
.”).
22. See id. at *5-6.
23. Id. at *205.
24. State v. Bass, 120 S.E.2d 580, 586 (N.C. 1961).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1980).
26. Id. at § 2.11(2)(a).
27. Id. at § 2.11(2)(b).
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(iii) when the bodily harm was inflicted for the purpose of a
“recognized form of treatment” intended to improve the
patient’s physical or mental health. 28
This limited rule, which reflects the law in the absolute
majority of states, 29 has been criticized for its narrow scope and
arbitrary boundaries. As one judge remarked, it is “very
strange that a fight in private between two youths where one
may, at most, get a bloody nose should be unlawful, whereas a
boxing match where one heavyweight fighter seeks to knock
out his opponent and possibly do him very serious damage
should be lawful.” 30 Examples of the law’s arbitrariness are
abundant. Consider just a few.
1. Familial Breast Cancer Syndrome, Body Integrity
Identity Disorder, and Gender Identity Disorder
A woman who carries a breast cancer gene may choose to
Such radical surgery,
have a preventive mastectomy. 31
28. Id. at §§ 2.11(2)(c), 3.08(4)(a).
29. Thirteen states explicitly recognize a general defense of consent in
their statutes. See ALA.CODE § 13A-2-7 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505
(2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 451-453 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 702233,702-235 (1993) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(a)); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109 (2006) (omits equivalent of subsection (3)(c)); VERNON’S
ANN. MISS. STAT. §565.080; MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.080 (West 1999); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:6 (1996) (omits
equivalent of subsections (3)(c) and (3)(d)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10 (West
2005) (omits equivalent of subsection (3)(c)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08
(1997) (omits equivalent of subsection (3)(c)); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 311
(West 1998) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(a)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13104 (2003) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(c) and (3)); TEXAS PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.06 (Vernon 2003) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(c) and (3)).
Other states have incorporated the concept of consent in the Special Part of
their penal codes, making non-consent an element of an offense or providing
for the defense of consent with respect to specific crimes. See, e.g., 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2002) (“It shall be a defense to any offense under Section
12-13 through 12-16 of this Code [sexual crimes] where force or threat of force
is an element of the offense that the victim consented.”). Where the statute
does not explicitly mention consent, case law usually defines in what
circumstances consent may function as a defense. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 240 (West 1999) (“An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a
present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.”), with
People v. Gordon, 11 P. 762, 762 (Cal. 1886) (stating that an attempt made
with the victim’s consent “will not constitute an assault”).
30. R. v. Brown, [1994] 1 A.C. 212, 278 (H.L.) (Lord Slynn’s opinion).
31. See e.g., Jane E. Brody, Personal Health, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at
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although quite lawful, is considered to be controversial in
medical literature: there is little proof that, for purposes of
cancer prevention, it is superior to less extreme and disfiguring
For women with “familial breast cancer
alternatives. 32
syndrome,” a condition indicating a high risk for developing
breast cancer, 33 the primary advantage of the surgery is that it
helps to relieve chronic stress and anxiety over the substantial
likelihood of developing the disease. 34
Yet, considerations of emotional pain fail to legitimize an
elective surgery on a patient with Body Integrity Identity
Disorder (“BIID”), a rare ailment whose victims seek to become
amputees. 35 The limited statistics seem to indicate that, if
BIID patients succeed in their pursuit, their quality of life
improves dramatically. 36 A surgeon who agrees to perform
such an amputation, however, opens himself up to criminal
liability because his patients’ consent is legally invalid. 37
The BIID patients often compare themselves to those
suffering from Gender Identity Disorders (“GID”), describing
the common experience as “being “stuck in the wrong body.” 38
The law, however, treats the two groups very differently: the
GID patients can consent to a sex change operation, which
often involves removal of healthy sex organs, 39 whereas the
C13.
32. Lane D. Ziegler & Stephen S. Kroll, Primary Breast Cancer After
Prophylactic Mastectomy, 14 AM. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 451, 453 (1991)
(discussing controversial nature of prophylactic mastectomy and comparing it
with less radical alternatives).
33. Id. at 452.
34. See Mal Bebbington Hatcher et al., The Psychosocial Impact of
Bilateral Prophylactic Mastectomy: Prospective Study Using Questionnaires
and Semistructured Interviews, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 76 (2001).
35. Editorial, When It Feels Right to Cut Off Your Leg, GEELONG
ADVERTISER (Austl.), July 4, 2005, at 15.
36. Id.
37. But see Tim Bayne & Neil Levy, Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity
Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 75, 84-85
(2005) (arguing that, as long as people are legally sane, they should be
allowed to have their limbs amputated by a surgeon).
38. Carl Elliot, A New Way to Be Mad, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2000, at
73-74.
39. See G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (Ct. App. 1978) (stating
that “[t]he severity of the problem of transsexualism becomes obvious when
one contemplates the reality of the male transsexual’s desperate desire to
have normally functioning male genitals removed because the male sex
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BIID sufferers cannot consent to amputation of an arm or a
leg. 40
2. Sadomasochistic Beating, Religious Flagellation, and
Ritual Mutilation
According to the current rule of consent, a person may not
agree to physical injury. In practically every single case
involving consensual sadomasochistic beating, the defendant
was convicted of assault. In State v. Collier, for example, the
court held that the legislature did not intend to include
sadomasochistic encounters in the list of “‘sport, social or other
Religious
activity’” permitted under the Iowa Code. 41
flagellation, on the other hand, enjoys much more deferential
treatment by authorities. 42 In a 19th century Scottish case, the
court opined that “[i]n some cases, a beating may be consented
to as in the case of a father confessor ordering flagellation; but
this is not violence or assault, because there is consent.” 43
More recently, some courts have said that the law “may
prohibit religiously impelled physical attacks,” 44 but research
has revealed no actual legal cases. Some states even include
the element of non-consent in the definition of ritual
mutilation. The Illinois Criminal Code, for instance, provides:
A person commits the offense of ritual
mutilation, when he or she mutilates,
dismembers or tortures another person as part of
a ceremony, rite, initiation, observance,
organs are a source of immense psychological distress”).
40. See Annemarie Bridy, Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the
Medico-Ethical Limits of Self-Modification, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 148, 148,
151-55 (2004). Bridy states that, “[t]o the extent that society and its
institutions remain committed to a norm of bodily integrity that excludes the
disabled body, it will remain very difficult to collectively imagine that elective
amputation could be good medicine for apotemnophiles.” Id. at 155.
41. See State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985)
(quoting IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.1 (West 2003)).
42. Law Commission, Consultation Paper 139, Consent in the Criminal
Law 10.1-10.4 (1995).
43. Id. (internal citation omitted).
44. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1496 (D. Wyo. 1995).
See Ogletree v. State, 440 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (opining that,
even had the victim consented, the severe beating ordered by a pastor would
still constitute battery).
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performance or practice, and the victim did not
consent or under such circumstances that the
defendant knew or should have known that the
victim was unable to render effective consent. 45
The italicized language indicates that if the religious
mutilation, dismemberment, or torture is done with the
consent of the victim, such activity should be lawful.
3. Consensual Transmission of HIV
Even though consensual beating constitutes a crime,
consensual intentional transmission of HIV is most likely not
punishable in a significant number of states. The phenomenon,
known as “bug-chasing,” involves “bug-chasers” (HIV-negative
men who actively seek out infection by having unprotected sex
with infected partners) and “gift-givers” (HIV-positive men
willing to infect “bug-chasers”). According to a source, this
practice is the cause of 25 percent of all new infections among
American gay men. 46 These statistics have been questioned,
but even if they are not entirely accurate, there is a general
consensus that “bug-chasing” and “gift-giving” present a
serious problem for the gay community. 47 Nevertheless, out of
twenty-four states that have statutes criminalizing the act of
knowingly exposing another human being to HIV, eight states
explicitly recognize consent of the victim as an affirmative
defense, 48 and another ten reach the same outcome by making
failure to disclose one’s HIV status an element of the crime. 49
Since any harmful act that does not fit into the “athletic”
or “medical” exception is, by definition, criminal, unless the
inflicted injury is not serious, assessment of the seriousness of
45. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-32(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
46. Gregory A. Freeman, Bug Chasers: The Men Who Long to Be HIV+,
ROLLING STONE, Jan. 23, 2003, available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/5939950/bug_chasers.
47. Amanda Weiss, Comment, Criminalizing Consensual Transmission
of HIV, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389, 389-90 (2006).
48. Those states are: Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Tennessee. Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina,
Crime and Punishment: Is There a Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention
Policy?, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 821, 854 (2004).
49. Those states are: Arkansas, California, Georgia, Louisiana,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. Id.
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the victim’s injury determines the outcome of many cases
involving consensual harm. A typical penal statute classifies
bodily injury as serious if it “creates a substantial risk of death
or . . . causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ.” 50 Pursuant to this definition, any short-term, non-lifethreatening injury should not be deemed “serious.” Yet, as the
MPC acknowledges, the assessment of the seriousness of harm
is often affected by judges’ “moral judgments about the iniquity
of the conduct involved.” 51 Courts tend to inflate the risk and
harmfulness of an activity they want to denounce. For
example, any injury caused during a sadomasochistic
encounter has been consistently classified as serious.
In State v. Collier, the victim’s injuries consisted of “a
swollen lip, large welts on her ankles, wrists, hips, buttocks,
and severe bruises on her thighs.” 52 The defendant was
convicted of assault resulting in a serious injury, and the
appellate court agreed, although, as the dissenting judge
pointed out, the inflicted bodily harm did not constitute a
serious injury within the meaning of the state statute. 53
Some state penal codes include physical pain in the
definition of “bodily harm.” 54 In State v. Guinn, the defendant
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (1980). Following the Model Penal
Code,, many states have adopted an identical or similar definition. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-1(b) (West 2005); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(46)
(Vernon 2005).
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 cmt. 2 n.8 (1980). The Commentary
points out that the MPC provision does not explicitly foreclose resort to such
judgments, though the envisioned emphasis is on the amount of injury itself.
Id.
52. State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). See R v.
Donovan, (1934) 2 Eng. Rep. 498, 502-03 (K.B.) (“seven or eight red marks”
on the body of a participant of a sadomasochistic encounter found to be
sufficient for an assault conviction); R v. Emmett, [1999] EWCA (Crim) 1710
(Eng.) (bloodshot eyes and a burn, which had completely healed by the time
of the trial, sufficed for an assault conviction of a participant of consensual
sadomasochistic sex).
53. Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 309 (Schlegel, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(2) (1980); WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.04.110(4)(a) (2004) (“‘Bodily injury,’ ‘physical injury,’ or ‘bodily harm’
means physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical
condition.”). In State v. Guinn, the relevant statute did not define “serious
physical injury.” State v. Guinn, No. 23886-1-II, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS
502, at *33 (Ct. App. March 30, 2001). But “‘substantial bodily harm’” was
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was convicted of inflicting “serious physical injury” in the
course of a sexual encounter. 55 There was no evidence that the
victim “‘ever required any medical attention or suffered any
wounds of any sort.’” 56 Yet the appellate court sustained the
assault conviction, reasoning that the sadomasochistic
paraphernalia used by the defendant must have caused serious
physical pain (candle wax was “‘hot and it stung’” and nipple
clamps were “‘tight and cutting’”), 57 and “physical pain”
satisfied the definition of “physical injury.” 58 Naturally, under
a statute of this type, practically any sadomasochistic activity
may be characterized as criminal.
The current rule of consent to harm is problematic on
many levels: not only is it arbitrary and strict; it is also
autocratic and absolute. People are allowed to consent to harm
only if their activities are on the list of things approved by the
state. The law envisions no balancing or accommodation of
conflicting interests of an individual and society.
The
disregard for an individual, inherent in this rule, goes against
the basic principles of autonomy and personal responsibility
defining American criminal law. Moreover, the authoritarian
presumption that it is not an individual, but rather the state
that is the victim of every crime is plainly wrong because, if
that were so, then consent would not be a defense to any
harm. 59 Yet we know that individuals are free to consent to all
kinds of harm—emotional, financial, reputational—as long as
these harms are not physical.
defined as “bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial
disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which causes a
fracture of any bodily part.’” Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.110(4)(b)
(2004)). And “‘great bodily harm’” was defined as “‘bodily injury which
creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily part or organ.’” Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.04.110(4)(c) (2004)).
55. Guinn, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 502, at *32.
56. Id. at *34.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime
and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 570 (2004) (pointing out that, “if the
state were indeed the victim of every crime, then consent should be a defense
to none.”).
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This critique prompts two questions: one, why do we
perceive consent to bodily harm so differently than consent to
any other activity, specifically, why does consent preclude such
offenses as theft, rape, or kidnapping but not murder or
battery; and two, if we were to revise the current law of
consent, where should we draw the line between permissible
and impermissible bodily harm?
II. Why Consent to Physical Harm is Treated Differently Than
Consent to Any Other Limitation of Rights
To have a right means to have a certain moral status.
Consent is a way to change this status unilaterally by
transferring to another person a claim, privilege, power, or
immunity. 60 For example, by promising a neighbor to sell him
my car, I give him a claim against me with regard to that
promise. By consenting to a root canal procedure, I give my
dentist a privilege to perform it. By inviting a friend to dinner,
I give him a power to visit me. In all those instances, I waive a
right I used to have and give other people rights they did not
have before. And yet there is an important difference in how
consent changes the relevant relationship between the parties
in some of these scenarios.
Recall the MPC consent provisions. Under the MPC,
voluntary consent of a legally competent individual may trigger
two different rules, either the general rule or the specific rule
for consent to bodily harm. We already reviewed the latter;
now let’s have a closer look at the former. The MPC general
rule of consent provides that consent of the victim is a defense
if it either “negatives an element of the offense or precludes the
infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense.” 61 What is peculiar in this rule is that
both grounds for the defense have little to do with the theory of
defenses.
Any defense presumes that a criminal act has been
committed; however, it was committed under the
60. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS (1923). See also JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS
360-61 (1990).
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1980) (emphasis added).

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art46

BERGELSON-COCEPTUALIZING CONSENT (FOR SSRN).DOC

2008]

CONSENT TO HARM

7/17/2008 4:21 PM

113

circumstances that may either justify or excuse the
perpetrator. An act is criminal only if it encompasses all
elements of the offense. If an element is missing, no defense is
needed simply because the perpetrator is not guilty even of a
prima facie criminal wrongdoing. 62 For example, each of the
offenses of rape, kidnapping, and theft includes in its definition
the element of non-consent. 63 If that element is negated by the
victim’s acquiescence, the defendant is completely exonerated
by the so-called failure of proof. In these circumstances,
consent of the victim does not serve as a defense; instead, it
defeats the very possibility of an offense.
The second, alternative ground for the MPC defense of
consent is also puzzling: on the one hand, it almost verbatim
repeats a segment of Section 3.02, which summarizes general
requirements for a defense of justification; on the other hand it
differs from Section 3.02 in a meaningful way. Section 3.02
maintains that conduct is justifiable if “the harm or evil sought
to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense charged.” 64 The
italicized words coincide with the language of Section 2.11.
However, if the general justification provision requires only
that the inflicted harm or evil be lesser than the harm or evil
that was avoided, the consent provision talks about complete
preclusion of any harm or evil that is sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense. The consent provision, thus,
exculpates the defendant only when social harm is entirely
avoided. But if there is no social harm, why should the
defendant even need a defense? Isn’t this provision merely a
broader version of the first part of the section (i.e. negation of
an element of the offense charged)?
The materials of the American Law Institute (“ALI”)
proceedings confirm this supposition.
According to MPC
Reporter Herbert Wechsler, the alternative ground for relief in

62. “Justification and excuses do not seek to refute any required element
of the prosecution’s case; rather they suggest further considerations that
negate culpability even when all elements of the offense are clearly present.”
SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SHULHOFER & CAROLE S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 737 (8th ed. 2007).
63. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 212.1, 213.1, 223.2 (1980).
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1980) (emphasis added).
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Section 2.11(1) was intended to cover a situation when the
definition of an offense, which logically should have
incorporated the non-consent language, by legislative oversight
or for some other reason, omitted it:
There are also cases where in the definition of a crime
the words “without consent” have not been put in, but
where it is perfectly clear that in the legislative
conception of the offense the idea it is intended, and
that’s the purpose for the rest of part (1), that if
consent precludes the infliction of the harm or evil
sought to be prevented by the legislature, then even
though it doesn’t negative the formal element, it still
ought to be a defense. 65

In other words, the defense of consent set forth in Section
2.11(1) of the MPC is not a defense at all. Instead it is another
way to state the rule that a person is not guilty of an offense
unless each element of the offense is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. 66
In that sense, Section 2.11(1) is
redundant, and the drafters of the MPC have acknowledged
that by calling it “merely tautological” 67 and contrasting it with
the specific rule of consent to bodily harm stated in Section
2.11(2):
Now, the second part is more than tautological. There
is a real need to indicate when and how far consent
should be a defense to bodily injury crimes, because
again you wouldn’t draft a murder statute in terms of
killing somebody without his consent. Obviously, the
idea is that it’s a crime whether he consents or not,
and how far consent to bodily injury should go

65. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE 39TH ANNUAL MEETING, 90-91 (1962). A typical case envisioned by
the drafters of the MPC would involve damage of property with the owner’s
consent. Id. at 91 (“Obviously the whole idea of the crime is misusing
somebody else’s property.”).
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (1980) (“No person may be convicted of
an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is
assumed.”).
67. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 65, at
90.
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involves some deep questions of policy. 68

The conceptual imprecision of Section 2.11 would be of
little interest today had it not reflected an important intuition
of the MPC drafters apparent in their attempt to differentiate
between two entirely different roles of consent in criminal law.
Compare cases of rape, kidnapping, or theft on the one hand,
and cases of killing or maiming on the other. In the first group
of cases, the act itself does not violate a prohibitory norm.
Having sex, transporting someone to a different location, or
taking other people’s property is not bad in itself. It becomes
bad only due to the absence of consent. In other words, no
matter how we draft the statute, in cases of theft, rape, or
kidnapping the role of consent is inculpatory—non-consent is a
part of the definition of the offense. 69
In contrast, causing pain, injury, or death is not morally
neutral; it is regrettable. 70 Bringing about a regrettable state
of events is bad and should be avoided. 71 Therefore, the law
should promote a conduct rule that prohibits the very act of
killing or hurting, providing, of course, for the necessary
exceptions, such as self-defense. However, the fact that a
person may be legally justified in killing an aggressor does not
make the killing as morally neutral as borrowing a book—it is
still regrettable. It is still regrettable that a dental patient has
to suffer pain, even though the dentist is justified in causing
it, 72 whereas there is nothing regrettable in consensual sex or
consensual change of ownership. To lose or reduce its inherent
68. Id. at 91.
69. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 705 (1978);
Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt, at 202-03.
70. See, e.g., R v. Brown, [1994] 1 A.C. 212, 250 (H.L.) (Lord Lowry’s
opinion) (opining that “for one person to inflict any injury on another without
good reason is an evil in itself (malum in se) and contrary to public policy”).
71. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 18 (1988) (defining evil in the most generic sense as
“any occurrence or state of affairs that is rather seriously to be regretted”).
72. Peter Westen has correctly pointed out that consent to injury does
not eliminate its harmfulness. PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE
DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL
CONDUCT 115 (2004) (observing that it would be “patently false to say that a
person who consents to conduct, e.g., a medical patient who consents to
surgical amputation of an eye or limb or a breast, suffers no burdens or
setbacks to her interests of any kind from it.”).
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wrongfulness, the act of killing or hurting requires
justification. The role of consent here is exculpatory; it may
only serve as a defense.
To distinguish a definition from a defense, as George
Fletcher has insightfully observed, we need to identify a
prohibitory norm, which “must contain a sufficient number of
elements to state a coherent moral imperative.” 73 In the case
of killing or inflicting pain, this imperative is quite
straightforward: do not kill, do not inflict pain. But what
conduct rule do we want to convey to the community in cases of
rape, theft, or criminal mischief? Should it say: Do not have
sex? Do not take other people’s possessions? Do not break
other people’s property? Certainly not. Even the last rule, the
most controversial of the three, would be unmerited and
impracticable. There is nothing wrong with breaking things.
People may need to break things, including those belonging to
others, in the process of construction, repair, cleaning, cooking,
or just having fun. We do not want to prohibit useful or
morally neutral activities. What we want to prohibit is
engaging in these activities under the circumstances that make
such activities wrongful.
Accordingly, the conduct rule
applicable to killing or hurting does not require the nonconsent language, whereas the conduct rule prohibiting rape,
theft, or criminal mischief simply makes no sense without the
non-consent element.
In practical terms, this distinction means that consent
precludes even a prima facie case of rape, theft, or criminal
mischief, regardless of whether the consensual act brings about
more good than harm, and regardless of whether the defendant
is aware of the victim’s consent. Significantly more is required
for a successful defense. Why is that so? Mainly because we
view a defense of justification as a limited license to commit an
otherwise prohibited act in order to achieve a socially and
morally desirable outcome. 74 For instance, if a group of
mountaineers, caught by a snowstorm, took refuge in a
deserted cabin and consumed the owner’s provisions, they
73. FLETCHER, supra note 69, at 568.
74. Id. at 565 (arguing that justification is an exception to a prohibitory
norm and, as such, should be available only to those who merit special
treatment).
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would be justified under the defense of necessity. 75 This
limited license is teleological in nature; it presumes an
objective need, an objectively preferable outcome, and the good
faith of the actors. If, say, the mountaineers committed the
break-in because, in their minds, it was a lesser evil than
remaining hungry for the next few hours, they would not be
entitled to the defense. 76 Nor would they be justified if the
reason for breaking in was a desire to have an impromptu
party in the cabin. The mountaineers would not be justified
even if, unknowingly, they in fact saved their lives by hiding
from the upcoming snowstorm. 77
Thus, in order to be justified, the mountaineers must
establish three elements:
(i) the basis for the defense (actual necessity);
(ii) an objectively preferable outcome (a positive balance
of harms and evils); and
(iii) the subjective belief in the necessity of overstepping
a prohibitory norm in order to achieve this preferable
outcome. 78
Similarly, to be justified for hurting someone in selfdefense or defense of another, the defendant must establish:
(i) the basis for the defense (immediate necessity to fend off
an unlawful attack); 79
(ii) an objectively preferable outcome (it is preferable to
harm an aggressor rather than allow the aggressor to harm an
innocent victim); and
75. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1 (1980).
76. See id. at § 3.02 cmt. 2 (pointing out that “one who takes a life in
order to avoid financial ruin does not act from a justifying necessity”).
77. But see Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm
as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 288-91 (1975)
(arguing that claims of justification should prevail regardless of the actor’s
state of mind).
78. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 2 (1980) (“It is not enough that
the actor believes that his behavior possibly may be conducive to
ameliorating certain evils; he must believe it is ‘necessary’ to avoid the
evils.”).
79. The MPC is different: its self-defense provision is entirely subjective.
As long as the actor believes his use of force to be necessary to fend off an
unlawful attack, he is justified. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04. The actor may
still be responsible for reckless (or negligent) homicide or injury if his beliefs
were held recklessly (or negligently).
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(iii) the subjective belief in the necessity of overstepping a
prohibitory norm in order to achieve this preferable outcome.
If the perpetrator used force in the absence of necessity (no
basis for defense) or injured several innocent bystanders in
order to immobilize the aggressor (not an objectively preferable
outcome), he would not be justified (although he may be
excused). Nor would he be justified if he merely used the
attack as a ploy to harm the aggressor (bad faith).
The last point may be illustrated by the following example:
suppose person A hates his enemy B and wants him dead.
Knowing that B frequents a certain bar, A spends night after
night outside the bar waiting for an occasion. While he is
waiting, he witnesses numerous fights, sexual assaults, even
murders; however, he never interferes, until finally one day he
sees B attacking another patron C with deadly force. Knowing
the law of defense of another, 80 A intervenes and kills B. At his
trial, A honestly tells his story of patience and determination.
Should he be rewarded for these qualities and completely
exonerated, even though we know that he would not have
defended C but for his desire to kill B?
I think most of us would view such acquittal as a mockery
of justice. Justification defenses are not intended to provide
people with convenient opportunities to commit crimes. Any
justifiable conduct requires good faith; and, in the context of a
limited license to overstep a prohibitory norm, the requirement
of good faith should be satisfied only when the subjective
purpose of the perpetrator is directed towards the goals for
which that license is granted.
Furthermore, under the MPC, the “choice of evils” is not
available as a defense against a reckless (or negligent) crime if
the defendant was reckless (or negligent) in bringing about the
situation that made the injurious choice necessary. 81
Similarly, the MPC and the law of most states deny the
perpetrator the justifications of self-defense and defense of
another in prosecution for a reckless (or negligent) crime, if the
80. See, e.g., id. at § 3.05.
81. Id. at § 3.02(2). In a number of states, the rule is even stricter: the
defense of necessity is completely foreclosed for an actor who was at fault in
bringing about the situation requiring the choice of harms or evils. See id. §
3.02 cmt. 5 n.27.
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belief that would otherwise justify his actions was held
recklessly (or negligently). 82 Under this logic, should not a
defendant who intentionally placed himself in a situation in
which he would be able to use the defense of another as a cover
up for intentional homicide be denied the defense of
justification? The language of the MPC certainly suggests this
conclusion: in determining the perpetrator’s eligibility for selfdefense and related defenses, the MPC addresses only the actor
who “believes that the use of force upon or toward the person of
another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such
belief would establish a justification.” 83
Applying the same logic to the defense of consent, we,
therefore, should only grant complete justification to the
perpetrator who can establish all requirements of the
justificatory defense, namely:
(i) the basis for the defense (valid consent of the victim);
(ii) an objectively preferable outcome (a positive balance of
harms and evils); and
(iii) the subjective belief in the necessity of hurting the
victim in order to achieve this preferable outcome.
In what follows I consider these requirements and their
application in more detail.
III. The Defense of Consent
The requirement of valid consent is quite straightforward,
at least in theory. 84 To be valid, consent must be rational and
voluntary, that is, freely given and informed. 85 Consent
obtained by duress or fraud regarding the nature of the
perpetrator’s act is void ab initio. 86 Certain groups of people
(e.g., children, mentally ill, intoxicated), in most instances, are
deemed incapable of granting valid consent. 87 In addition,
82. Id. at § 3.09.
83. Id. at § 3.09(2) (emphasis added).
84. For an excellent discussion of confusion between actual and legally
valid consent, see WESTEN, supra note 72, at 119-24.
85. See, e.g., 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW:
HARM TO SELF 316 (1986) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF].
86. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(d)(3), § 2.11 cmt. 3 (1980).
87. See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 85, at 316. Feinberg wrote:
If he is so impaired or undeveloped cognitively that he doesn’t really
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there is a strong argument that courts should require higher
levels of rationality and voluntariness of the victim’s decision
as the amount of inflicted or risked harm increases. 88 For
example, simple “sure, why not?” may be sufficient to
constitute consent for piercing—but not cutting off—one’s
ears. 89
One could argue that, when the perpetrator, acting in good
faith, produces a measurably positive outcome, consent of the
victim does not matter. This claim would be faulty. Consider
Gilbert v. State, in which the court convicted a seventy-fiveyear-old man of first-degree murder for shooting his wife to
death. 90 Roswell and Emily Gilbert had been married for fiftyone years. 91 For the last few years of her life, Emily suffered
from osteoporosis and Alzheimer’s disease, and her condition
rapidly deteriorated. 92 Testifying at his trial, Roswell Gilbert
said: “‘there she was in pain and all this confusion and I guess
if I got cold as icewater that’s what had happened. I thought to
myself, I’ve got to do it . . . I’ve got to end her suffering . . . .’” 93
As dramatic and sad as this case is, the appellate court was
right to affirm the defendant’s conviction. Roswell Gilbert was
motivated by compassion and desire to protect his wife from
suffering and, in fact, he did everything in his power to make
her death as painless as possible. 94 But even if her condition
was so desperate that Roswell objectively benefited Emily by

know what he is doing, or so impaired or undeveloped volitionally that
he cannot help what he is doing, then no matter what expression of
assent he may appear to give, it will lack the effect of genuine consent.
Id.
88. Id. at 117-21.
89. Id. at 124-27. Feinberg wrote:
In the cases of “presumably nonvoluntary behavior,” what we
“presume” is either that the actor is ignorant or mistaken about what
he is doing, or acting under some sort of compulsion, or suffering from
some sort of incapacity, and that if that were not the case, he would
choose not to do what he seems bent on doing now.
Id. at 124.
90. Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1186-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
91. Id. at 1187.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1188 (acknowledging the defendant’s explanation that he used
a gun because it causes instantaneous death).
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cutting short her agony, he should not be entitled to
justification. Unauthorized homicide of an autonomous human
being is, and should be, murder. No one has the right to decide
for another person that his life is not worth living, or, citing the
words of the Gilbert opinion, “‘[g]ood faith’ is not a legal defense
to first degree murder.” 95
The requirement to achieve a positive balance of harms
and evils raises a more complicated question of law and policy.
Traditionally, criminal harm is understood as wrongful
interference with the victim’s essential welfare interests.96 The
interference is deemed wrongful if it violates the victim’s
rights. From this perspective, consensual physical harm
presents a problem: since consent constitutes a waiver of
rights, the perpetrator who kills or injures a willing victim does
not violate the victim’s rights. But can we say that cases of
voluntary euthanasia, consensual cannibalistic killing, and
sadomasochistic beating are equally free from criminal
wrongdoing?
In an attempt to resolve this problem, a number of scholars
have recently suggested that the concept of criminal harm
should not be limited to a violation of one’s autonomy. 97 In
their view, such acts as, say, consensual gladiatorial matches
are impermissible because they violate the participants’
dignity, and dignity is so essential to our humanity that, in
cases of a conflict between autonomy and dignity, the former
ought to yield. 98 For that reason, consent may not serve as a

95. Id. at 1191.
96. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
OTHERS 62 (1984). Those include “interests in the continuance for a
foreseeable interval of one’s life, and the interests in one’s own physical
health and vigor, the integrity and normal functioning of one’s body, the
absence of absorbing pain and suffering or grotesque disfigurement, minimal
intellectual acuity, emotional stability. . . .” Id. at 37.
97. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim’s State of
Mind, 88 CAL. L. REV. 759, 769-70 (2000); Dubber, supra note 59, at 568; R.A.
Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 13, 39-44 (2001); R. George
Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity NonCoercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1399 (1995).
98. Wright, supra note 97, at 1399; see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 97, at
777-78; Dubber, supra note 97, at 568 (arguing that personal autonomy
includes dignity, and that the concept of criminal harm should be based on
protection of a person rather than a state).
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defense to the violation of dignity.
I share the view that certain degrading behavior may be
wrongful even when it does not violate the victim’s rights.
Society may be concerned about human dignity in various
circumstances, including those in which a prohibitory norm
does not originate in a rights violation. Consider experiments
conducted in the 1980s that involved the use of fresh cadavers
When those experiments became
as “crash dummies.” 99
known, they caused public outrage. 100 But why? We usually do
not feel offended by autopsies or postmortem organ donation.
Perhaps, as Joel Feinberg has suggested, the answer has
something to do with the perceived symbolism of the different
uses:
In the air bag experiments cadavers were
violently smashed to bits, whereas dissections
are done in laboratories by white-robed medical
technicians in spotless antiseptic rooms,
radiating
the
newly
acquired
symbolic
respectability of professional medicine. 101
Or perhaps the difference is not merely symbolic, and
violently smashing cadavers to bits is, in fact, disrespectful—
disrespectful of our only recently shared humanity? An act of
autopsy or removal of an organ for transplantation is not
qualitatively different from a regular surgery. Extracting a
kidney, inter vivo or postmortem, does not reduce one’s moral
status to that of a thing. Smashing a body in an industrial
experiment or using human remains to manufacture soap does
have this effect. In other words, even when an act of indignity
is committed on an unconscious or dead body or when the
victim does not perceive an assault on his dignity as such, a
wrongful act has been done.
What is at stake here is people’s moral dignity, or dignity
of personhood, as opposed to social dignity, or dignity of rank.
Social dignity is nonessential; in a society that permits social
mobility, it can be gained and lost. 102 “Moral dignity, by
99. Joel Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, 15 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 31, 31-32 (1985).
100. Id. at 31.
101. Id.
102. Dubber, supra note 59, at 535.
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contrast, is an essential characteristic of all” human beings. 103
It is so important for our collective humanity that we extend it
not only to those “who satisfy “the minimum requirements of
personhood,” 104 but even to those who closely miss them.
And yet, as important as moral dignity is, its violation
should not be criminalized lightly.
Whenever the state
prohibits consensual behavior, for the sake of dignity or any
other reason, it suppresses individual liberty and autonomy—
partly paternalistically, but mostly for the benefit of society at
large. 105 Therefore, the threat to society should be serious
enough to warrant use of criminal sanctions. For instance, the
careless attitude to human dignity exhibited by “Fear Factor,”
a popular television reality show, has raised concerns of a
number of its viewers. One journalist commented: “Do we
really need to see people buried under 400 rats, each biting the
exposed body parts of the desperate contestants? No. And it
doesn't get any more palatable when someone yells out, ‘Keep
your butt cheeks clenched!’” 106
It is understandable that those pictures could disturb some
members of the public, but the nature and magnitude of the
personal and societal harm brought about by the show did not
rise to the level that would justify a criminal ban—that harm
was simply “not the law’s business,” 107 at least, not the
criminal law’s business. Anthony Duff has accurately observed
103. See id. Dan-Cohen makes a similar point when he observes that
the term “dignity” should be understood as “moral worth” and not “social
status.” See MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF,
AND MORALITY 169 n.23 (2002).
104. Dubber, supra note 59, at 535.
105. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 85, at 172.
When B requests that A do something for (or to) him that is directly
harmful or dangerous to B’s interests, or when the idea originates with
A and he solicits and receives B’s permission to do that thing, then (in
either case) B can be said to have “consented” to A’s action. If
nevertheless the criminal law prohibits A from acting in such cases, it
invades B’s liberty (by preventing him from getting what he wanted
from A) or his autonomy (by depriving his voluntary consent of its
effect).
106 Tim Goodman, Reality TV Hits a Tailspin with NBC's “Fear
Factor.” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 11, 2001, section E-1, Final
edition.

107. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 133 (Stein & Day 1963).
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that not punishing someone’s conduct does not mean approving
of it; instead, that can mean the lack of standing to judge or
condemn such conduct. 108 We do not have to approve of radical
cosmetic surgery, religious flagellation, or sadomasochistic
brutality, however, society may be better served by not
prosecuting those consensual activities.
In other words, not every violation of human dignity
deserves criminal punishment, but only such that affects
society at large. As I argued elsewhere, to avoid overcriminalization yet capture the most egregious cases, the
criminal doctrine should be revised to explicitly include dignity
violation in the concept of wrongdoing. 109 Criminal harm then
would retain its current meaning as a wrongful setback to an
important welfare interest, but “wrongful” would mean either
(i) such as violates the victim’s autonomy, or (ii) such as
violates the victim’s dignity. 110 The two kinds of criminal harm
comprise the same evil—objectification of another human
being. That evil may be brought about by an injury to a vital
human interest, combined with either a rights violation (e.g.,
theft) or disregard of the victim’s dignity (e.g., consensual
deadly torture). The absolute majority of criminal offenses,
being non-consensual, include both kinds of harm.
As for consensual physical harm, it should be punishable
only when an important welfare interest normally protected by
criminal law is set back in a way that denies the victim his
equal moral worth. The recent German case in which Armin
Meiwes killed his willing victim, Bernd Juergen Brandes, and
then cannibalized on his flesh, may serve as an example. 111 By
killing Brandes, Meiwes did not violate Brandes’s right to life.
However, he not only defeated the most essential interest of
Brandes (his interest in continued living) but also used
108. Duff, supra note 97, at 36.
109. Bergelson, supra note 69, at 219-221.
110. Interestingly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes
this distinction quite clear when it states in Article 1: “All human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
111. See Michael Cook, Moral Mayhem of Murder on the Menu, HERALD
SUN (Melbourne, Austl.), Jan. 15, 2004, at 17, available at
http://www.australasianbioethics.org/Media/2004-01-16-MC-cannibal.html.
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Brandes as an object, a means of obtaining the desired
cannibalistic experience, and thus disregarded his dignity.
In contrast, a consensual mercy killing of a suffering,
terminally ill patient certainly also destroys the patient’s
interest in continued living. Yet, when warranted by the
patient’s condition and motivated by compassion, such killing
respects and preserves the dignity of the dying individual, and,
therefore, should not be subject to criminal liability. In
Michigan v. Kevorkian, the state prosecuted Dr. Kevorkian for
administering a lethal injection to a former racecar driver who,
due to advanced Lou Gehrig’s disease, was no longer able to
move, eat, or breathe on his own. 112 Even the patient’s family
had accepted his choice to escape the suffering and indignity of
the slow demise. 113 But not the trial court or the appellate
court: Dr. Kevorkian was convicted of second-degree murder,
and his conviction was affirmed. 114 I suggest that these
decisions were erroneous.
To summarize, in order to satisfy the second requirement
of the defense of consent, the perpetrator must establish that,
to the extent he set back the victim’s welfare interests and, at
the same time, disregarded the victim’s dignity, the harmful
act nevertheless produced an objectively positive outcome. In
other words, the more serious (disabling and irreversible) the
harm to the victim, the more significant the benefits of the
injurious action must be. A sadomasochistic beating, which
leaves no permanent damage, should be justified by the mere
fact that its participants desired it. Even those who believe
that such a beating offends the victim’s dignity would probably
agree that it does not significantly affect the victim’s long-term
interests.
On the other hand, only extraordinary
circumstances might be able to justify consensual deadly
torture.
Finally, for complete justification, the perpetrator would
have to establish that he not only achieved a positive balance of
harms and evils but also intended it while causing harm. This
subjective requirement is particularly appropriate in the case

112. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 298 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 296.
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of defense of consent. Just like in cases of necessity or selfdefense, consent does not impose on the perpetrator an
obligation to act; it merely provides him with an option.
However, unlike necessity or a life-threatening attack, consent
of the victim creates a very weak content-independent reason
for action.
When a child breaks a rule, we demand: “Why did you do
that?” This is a question about a moral reason for action and
effectively about the availability of a defense. What we want to
know is whether the child had a good reason for violating the
rule of conduct. We are unlikely to accept “because such-andsuch asked me to” as a valid reason or defense. The classic
parental reply to that would be: “And what if he asked you to
jump off the Brooklyn Bridge?” By this reply, we in fact say:
“You are a free moral agent. Why, being a free moral agent,
did you choose to break the rule (cause harm)?” In the same
sense, consent of the victim may justify the defendant only if
the defendant had a morally sustainable reason for inflicting
pain, injury or death.
The proposed conceptualization of the defense of consent
has two normative consequences. One is that consent alone
does not suffice to justify the victim’s death or injury; the other
is that consent should always be at least a partial defense,
because it defeats at least one aspect of harm, namely violation
of rights. A partial justification does not make a wrongful act
right; it only makes it less wrongful compared to an identical
but non-consensual act. Take a lifeboat scenario, in which all
will die, unless a few sacrifice their lives by jumping overboard.
Assume that the necessary number of people have volunteered,
but for whatever reason (perhaps they are too weak to be able
to move), they cannot complete the suicidal act on their own.
Would it be wrong to push them off? I believe that even if it
would be wrong, it would certainly be less wrong than
drowning those who have not volunteered. 115 It would be less
wrong because the person who threw the victims over did not
violate their rights. Accordingly, he brought about less harm
than in an identical but non-consensual act and, thus, should

115. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 708 (1997) (making a similar
argument).
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deserve a lesser punishment.
The perpetrator should be entitled only to partial
justification if any of the following is true:
(i) the harmful consensual act has brought about more bad
than good (e.g., the euthanized patient was not in pain and had
excellent prospects of recovery);
(ii) the harmful consensual act has significantly set back
the victim’s interests and dignity (e.g., the Meiwes-Brandes
case of murder and cannibalism);
(iii) the perpetrator’s conscious goal was to bring about evil
results (e.g., killing a consenting, terminally ill patient out of
sheer hatred for him and his family who will be financially
ruined when he dies); or
(iv) the perpetrator’s conscious goal was to set back
significantly the victim’s interests and dignity (e.g., with the
intent of injuring the victim’s body and self-esteem, hiring the
victim for severe and humiliating beating).
The first example is typically a case of a mistake of
judgment. Like any other mistake, that case should be treated
as an instance of excuse and not justification. 116 If the
perpetrator’s mistake was reasonable, he should be completely
exonerated from criminal punishment. For members of the
medical profession, it may be advisable to add a rebuttable
presumption that, when in the course of consensual treatment
they cause pain or injury to their patients, they act
appropriately and in the interests of those patients, i.e., to shift
the burden of production with respect to any alleged
wrongdoing to the prosecution.
The second example involves the kind of harm, which, as
discussed above, should be prohibited by criminal law,
irrespective of the parties’ intentions and preferences.
The third and fourth examples involve situations in which
the perpetrator’s reasons for causing consensual harm are
malevolent. Even if we assume that the perpetrator’s purpose
was frustrated (e.g., in the third example, the terminally ill

116. See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument
for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 407-08
(2005) (discussing why mistake should be a defense of excuse and not
justification and citing conflicting views of the issue).
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man was spared the suffering of his final days, and his family
found a way out of financial trouble; and, in the fourth
example, the victim’s injuries were not particularly severe),
still the malicious purpose, combined with the voluntary act,
makes the perpetrator guilty. In the third example, the
perpetrator simply lacks a good reason necessary for
justification: hatred does not justify intentional killing.
In the last example (still assuming the frustration of
purpose), the perpetrator’s wrongdoing is somewhat similar to
an attempt. In the case of an attempt, the perpetrator commits
a wrongful act with a culpable state of mind, but does not bring
about the social harm proscribed by the completed offense. In
an attempted murder, for instance, the perpetrator shoots with
the purpose to kill, but misses his victim. His act is wrongful
because its objective is to violate the rights of the victim: people
have a right not to be physically attacked without provocation.
In my fourth example, the perpetrator also commits a wrongful
act with a culpable state of mind, namely, he beats the victim
with the purpose of causing injury to the victim’s body and
dignity. This act does not violate the victim’s rights because it
is consensual. It is nevertheless wrongful under the theory of
harm advocated here because its objective is to damage the
victim’s essential welfare interests and dignity. Due to the
wrongfulness of his purpose, the perpetrator is not entitled to
complete justification.
Unlike the case of attempt, the
perpetrator in the last example does cause the social harm
proscribed by the underlying offense, yet not all of the
proscribed harm. Thus, he is guilty of the completed, albeit
mitigated, offense.
Naturally, the extent of partial justification attributed to
the victim’s consent should depend on the facts of each case
and, at a minimum, reflect the importance of the victim’s
interests (both harmed and intended to be harmed), the extent
of the actual and intended damage to the victim’s interests and
dignity, and the actual and intended balance of harms/evils
and benefits. In many instances, partial justification will
reduce the perpetrator’s punishment to the minimal level. In
the third example above, the perpetrator’s fault is not very
significant. He does not violate the victim’s dignity, and while
destroying the victim’s interest in continued living, he
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advances the victim’s interest in avoiding pain and suffering.
Due to his overall evil purpose, the perpetrator does not
deserve full justification, but this does not mean he ought to go
to jail. Community service or its equivalent may be much more
appropriate.
Conversely, the perpetrator in the second
example is guilty of a serious wrongdoing, and his partial
justification should not translate into the same mitigation of
punishment as the partial defense in the third example.
IV. Conclusion
Intentionally injuring or killing another person is
presumptively wrong. To overcome this presumption, the
perpetrator must establish a defense of justification. Consent
of the victim may serve as one of the grounds for such a
defense. For complete justification, the perpetrator’s reasons
for a consensual injurious act must be subjectively benevolent
and the act must produce an overall positive balance of harms
and evils, including harm to the victim’s welfare interests and
dignity. If these requirements are not met, the defense should
be only partial.
The proposed rule makes sense both theoretically and
practically. From the theoretical perspective, it places consent
squarely within the family of justification defenses. All of
them, from self-defense to necessity, seek to overcome the
deontological constraint against intentional infliction of harm.
These defenses may be granted to a person who chose a certain
course of action despite its negative effects (as opposed to for
the sake of its negative effects) and succeeded in producing a
better outcome. From the practical perspective, this rule
leaves room for balancing the harms and benefits caused by the
perpetrator. This is an important difference from the current
law, which is absolute in what it allows and disallows. Overall,
adopting a rule based on a uniform principle common to other
justification defenses would lead to more fair, consistent, and
morally sustainable verdicts.
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